Baghdad -was comprised of approximately 39,000 Soldiers that served in twelve brigade-sized elements comprised of a 62-battalion coalition task force focused primarily on Baghdad. 1 This relief in place occurred during a multiparty insurgency uprising. It is a difficult task to conduct a relief in place with any unit in a combat situation, further complicating the operation; the transition took place while in contact with the enemy. These conditions left Task Force Baghdad even more determined to achieve the campaign plan focused on Baghdad as the center of gravity in Iraq.
The population of Baghdad is estimated to be approximately 6-7 million people. The area of operations was approximately 25 kilometers by 26 kilometers. Geographically, about the size of Austin, Texas; the population density however, is comparable to Chicago, Illinois. Baghdad is an ancient city that was established in 762 and is divided by the Tigris River. The dense urban area is a mixture of skyscrapers in downtown Baghdad, one to two story buildings and mud brick huts in some of the surrounding areas. 2 The infrastructure of the city has suffered from years of decay and neglect under Sadam Hussein's regime. At the onset of OIF II, there were no functioning sewage treatment plants, sewage pump stations often operated at 25% capacity or not at all, and numerous sewer pipes were broken which allowed raw sewage to run into the streets. The water distribution network was likewise in very poor condition. To further complicate matters, many of the water distribution network pipes were broken and raw sewage often mixed with drinking water. It was a common sight in many areas of Baghdad to see raw sewage pooled in the streets. Needless to say, waterborne infections and disease were thriving in this environment.
Iraq's infrastructure was in much worse shape than the U.S. government believed. In an Powell stated that we underestimated the damage that had occurred to the infrastructure as a result of sanctions, but, more importantly, as a result of the manner Sadam Hussein ran the country in a brutal, dictatorial way for almost 30 years. Money was misused to buy weapons and to enrich the elite of the regime. It was not used to restore the infrastructure. 3 The requirements for large-scale economic assistance were staggering. Iraq's war with Iran from 1980-88, the Gulf War in 1991, which was followed by ten years of sanctions, resulted in a badly battered economy and decaying infrastructure. Cost estimates to rebuild Iraq range from $30 to $100 billion, and these figures do not include the cost of deploying and operating coalition forces. 4 To add to the staggering cost of rebuilding, the overall situation in Iraq is complex, On the civilian side of the house, the GST coordinated with the Coalition Provisional Authority Iraq, the United States wasted critical days, weeks and months engaging in a security effort before opposition movements could regroup or reengage. It left a power vacuum, rather than exploited one, and we were not prepared for nation building or the escalation of an insurgency.
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"If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought of the after effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war." 10 In every conflict, it is imperative that all lines of operation are coordinated, synchronized, and executed simultaneously and not sequentially.
SWET Operations to Restore Essential Services
When the First Cavalry Division arrived in Baghdad; the sewer system throughout the city was in deplorable condition. Even though large long-term construction projects were on going to improve the situation, completion of these large capital projects was years away. At the transfer of sovereignty in June of 2004, there were only 200 projects that had started throughout Iraq.
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There were no fully functional sewage treatment facilities operational in the Baghdad area. It was a common sight in many neighborhoods to see untreated sewage flowing down the streets, and emptying directly into nearby drainage systems and rivers. Additionally, it was common place for sewage to pool in neighborhoods where drainage was poor. This environment greatly contributed to unacceptable health conditions where waterborne diseases and infections thrived.
In eastern Baghdad in the Sadr City and Nine Nissan Districts, the majority of the population was poor, working class Shiites that were deprived of essential services under Sadam Hussein's regime. These two districts alone comprised over one-half of the population of Baghdad and were the responsibility of the 1 st BCT. Sewer, water, electrical and trash (SWET) services were either limited or non-existent in some areas. There were a few elite and wealthy families in Sunni and mixed neighborhoods that were able to pay for these services. However, the majority of the population struggled with the lack of essential services.
Sadr City, located in the northeast portion of Baghdad, had its own unique set of problems. Sadr City is approximately 6 KM by 8 KM and is home to an estimated population of 2 to 2.5 million people. Under Sadam Hussein, the infrastructure in this Shiite slum was allowed to deteriorate, creating intolerable conditions. Maintenance of the infrastructure was done mainly by the local population with very little help from Baghdad city officials. Because of this level of neglect, the sewer, water and electrical infrastructure had deteriorated to some of the worst conditions in Baghdad. Unemployment in the area was 60 to 70 percent and a large part of this group was fighting-age males between the ages of 15 to 45. This situation was an ideal breeding ground for militia and insurgent activity.
The First Mile of Essential Services
A critical component of the task force campaign plan was to repair or construct the first mile of city services through the use of local contractors and laborers. As the first among equal lines of operation, restoring and repairing essential services provided a visible and tangible sign of progress. The first mile concept was considered to be progress at the local level. The objective was to maximize the use of local contractors and workers, putting an Iraqi face on the work and security for the job site. Concentrating efforts at the local level produced many positive effects. These projects provided jobs to local contractors and laborers where unemployment rates in the fighting-age male population were 60-70%. These construction projects provided visible signs of progress in the neighborhoods and throughout the districts. For the first time in many cases, local laborers were part of the reconstruction effort and they were able to earn a respectable wage of $5-$7 dollars per day to provide for their families. Using local contractors and workers clearly denied insurgents and militia their power base.
From an engineering standpoint, it is much more efficient to use only heavy equipment during construction; however it is more effective to use a greater amount of laborers in the process to were employed by a subcontractor from Sadr City for several weeks to excavate the sewer line by hand. These employees were all residents of Sadr City and were grateful to be part of rebuilding their city. Although it may have been more efficient to allow a two-man crew operating a modern excavator to complete the task, it was tremendously more effective and had a positive impact on the community to employ large numbers of local laborers to dig the pipe trench. This was the beginning of working simultaneously across all lines of operations to deny the insurgents sanctuary, and to win the hearts and minds of the people. The people are the prize and their support is vital in order for the Iraqi government to succeed.
To further complicate matters, intermittent electrical power of only four to five hours per day to the sewage and water pumps only compounded the problems. Dedicated electrical power to the sewer and water pumps would enable these vital pump stations to operate 24 hours per day, everyday instead of being subject to load shedding and unreliable electrical power on the commercial electrical grid. After discussions with local officials and Baghdad
Ministry of Electricity, 1 st BCT, using CERP funding, immediately began contracts to install dedicated eleven kilovolt electrical lines to each of Sadr City's fifteen sewage pump stations.
The effect of installing dedicated electrical lines was to provide continuous electrical power, allowing the pumps to operate when required to relieve standing sewage in the surrounding neighborhoods. Once again, local contractors and laborers were used to accomplish the task.
Forward Engineer Support Team (FEST) Integration
In order to effectively and efficiently spend the millions of dollars available from the CERP was the first brigade-sized unit to request a team to be attached to them in a forward operating base. It was a great source of frustration for the BCT to always have to reach back to the international/green zone for higher level contracting and engineering support.
To achieve the optimum utilization of these teams, the FEST was embedded at the the Army Corps can marshal the management expertise to work in a dangerous security environment. 16 "At the same time, armed nation building is a challenge only the U.S. is currently equipped to meet. While allies, the U.N., and NGO's can help in many aspects of security and nation building operations, they often cannot operate on the scale required to deal with nation building in the midst of serious low intensity combat." 17 There was an initial honeymoon period with the majority of the Iraqi people because they were elated that they had been liberated from the brutal dictator Sadam Hussein. However, long term gratitude is unlikely to last if the Iraqi people believe the United States intervened for selfish reasons. A force initially viewed as positive can rapidly be viewed as invaders should an unwelcome occupation continue for a prolonged period of time. 18 There is a fleeting window of opportunity when the United States and coalition forces must be prepared to simultaneously execute stability and reconstruction operations while decisively employing all the elements of national power.
In order to take advantage of this fleeting window of opportunity, the Department of activity from the northern part of Sadr City to the southern part was having a positive effect on our operations. The residents in southern Sadr City were elated that work was being done in their neighborhoods. In contrast, the residents in the northern part of Sadr City began to complain because the reconstruction work had stopped and, along with the shift in effort, the jobs also shifted to the south. The power base of the militia and insurgents was being negatively impacted and they were beginning to loose the support of local Iraqis.
As events continued to unfold, construction was scheduled to restart north of Al-Qudis 24 The Army can use this opportunity to include engineer personnel and force structure in the FSC BCT. The
Chief of Staff of the Army should reassess manning requirements and force structure to include an organic combat engineer battalion in each FCS BCT. This would enhance movement and maneuver, survivability, stability operations that include restoring essential services, support to governance, economic and infrastructure development. The risk associated with not incorporating this change is that the FCS BCT becomes too focused on lethal operations, and is not capable of planning and conducting simultaneous engineering operations that enhance the capability of conducting full spectrum operations.
Recommendations
The following recommendations are designed to provide the maneuver commander with capabilities to simultaneously employ engineer and essential services assets during full spectrum operations:
• Empower Commanders by aggressively funding and reprogramming the Commander's Emergency Response Program for immediate impact on the local population. Every dollar spent on reconstruction is a dollar spent to protect the force.
• Incorporate Forward Engineer Support Teams with the Brigade Combat Team to immediately begin to plan, design, contract, manage and execute for immediate positive impact as well as a balance of long range/large capital projects.
• Place the military in charge of reconstruction in a non-permissive environment. The
United States Army Corps of Engineers is a Department of Defense organization, and has the capability and expertise to perform this function. As the security situation improves, the State Department, United States Agency for International Development and other agencies can take the lead.
• Prior to deployment, continue to foster relationships with local communities, and exchange ideas on reconstruction, governance, economic development and public administration. City administrators and planners can provide a wealth of knowledge and information that is not readily available in military channels or as part of the Army education system.
• Reassign an Engineer Battalion to each Brigade Combat Team to manage the engineering and reconstruction efforts. This will enable the brigade commander to plan, coordinate, synchronize and execute reconstruction, engineering and civil operations in a non-permissive environment, and facilitate transition to stability operations.
Conclusion
The security environment of the 21 st century is very dangerous and complex. Failed states and areas not governed by any form of civilized law are becoming more numerous.
Globalization and modern communications intertwine the international community together to form an inseparable bond. Ideologies where genuine hatred motivates misguided individuals to take their own lives to try and destroy other people and their way of life is becoming more common place. The enemy is envious of our success and will do anything to destroy it. Warfare takes on an asymmetric form where our enemies understand they can not defeat us militarily by attacking our strengths.
At a time when the Army needs to counter these asymmetric threats, we are reducing our engineer and essential services capability at the 'tip of the spear' with the brigade combat teams. Every mission cannot and should not focus solely on lethal operations. With the increased emphasis on stability operations, it is critical to keep engineer capability with the BCTs in the modular force and with the FCS BCT to achieve a more balanced application of power. The Army cannot afford to mortgage the future forces that enable stability operations.
The Army should be adding engineer expertise and resources to the BCT; however, these capabilities are being reduced and technology is expected to make up for the shortfall. As with the efforts of Task Force Baghdad, essential service and engineer efforts are extremely manpower and resource intensive. Technology alone did not achieve the desired effects in Sadr City and throughout Baghdad.
Engineers and stability operations enablers must be embedded with the BCTs in order to simultaneously plan, coordinate, design and manage projects that enhance the maneuver commander's ability to execute full spectrum operations. It is time we acknowledge the fact that "true long-term security does not come from the end of a gun in this culture; it comes from a balanced application of all five lines of operation." 
